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I. INTRODUCTION
"The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
achieve and enjoy good health" has long been recognized as a right
which should be assured to every American citizen.' Implementa-
tion of this right through health care legislation, however, has been
much less resounding than its declaration. 2 The Hospital Survey
and Construction Act passed by Congress in 1946, popularly known
as the Hill-Burton Act,' has recently been employed as a vehicle to
achieve this goal.
Through recent litigation4 and legislation,' dramatic changes
1. President Truman's Message to Congress on Health Legislation, [1945] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1143 [hereinafter cited as President Truman's Message to Congress].
2. See Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act:
Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 168 (1975); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L. J. 243 (1978). Even though the need
for national health insurance was actively discussed in the 1930's, national health insurance
is still not a reality in 1979.
3. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-290 (1976)). The Hill-Burton Act amended Title VI to
the Public Health Service Act.
4. See, e.g., Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
5. HEW Medical Facility Construction and Modernization; Requirements for Provision
of Services to Persons Unable to Pay and Community Service by Assisted Health Facilities,
44 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (1979) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124).
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have been made in the nature of Hill-Burton assisted facilities'
obligations to the Government and to the people of America. Facili-
ties that received Hill-Burton funds were required to make two as-
surances to the Government.6 In the attempt to make health care
available to more Americans, these assurances, the uncompensated
service assurance and the community service assurance,' have been
the focal point of the Government's expansion of Hill-Burton obliga-
tions.
Grantee hospitals object to the expansion of their Hill-Burton
contractual obligations as an unconstitutional impairment of con-
tract and violation of due process.8 This Note will explore the valid-
ity of that objection by first examining the changes in the contrac-
tual obligations of facilities that accepted Hill-Burton funds. The
Note will then review the protections afforded contract rights by the
contract clause and the fifth amendment due process clause. Fi-
nally, this Note will test the changes in the Hill-Burton contractual
obligations by the appropriate constitutional standard to determine
the validity of those changes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE HILL-BURTON AcT's Two ASSURANCES
The purpose of the Hill-Burton Act, as stated in section 601,
was to assist the states in determining their needs for medical facili-
ties that would adequately furnish hospital, clinic or similar services
to all their people and also to help finance the construction of
needed facilities.' Section 622 of the Act gave the Surgeon General
6. 42 C.F.R. H§ 53.62-63 (Supp. 1947).
7. See Part II infra.
8. See Summary of Public Comments And Department's Actions On The Uncompen-
sated Services And Community Service Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,382-99 (1979).
9. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 601, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) provides:
The purpose of this title is to assist the several States-
(a) to inventory their existing hospitals . . . to survey the need for construction
of hospitals, and to develop programs for construction of such public and other nonprofit
hospitals as will, in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the necessary physical
facilities for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and similar services to all their people;
and
(b) to construct public and other nonprofit hospitals in accordance with such
programs.
Although section 601 was amended by an Act of Oct. 25, 1949, ch. 722, § 6, Pub. L. No. 81-
380, 63 Stat. 900-01 (1949) and an Act of July 12, 1954, ch. 471, § 4(a), 68 Stat. 464 (1954), it
was not until an August 18, 1964 amendment that the phrase "physical facilities" was omit-
ted.
The amended declaration of purpose, found in § 600, stated:
The purpose of this title is -
(a) to assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for the con-
struction and modernization of such public or other nonprofit community hospitals and
[Vol. 32:14691470
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the power to prescribe certain regulations to implement the Act."
This authority was later transferred to the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW)." The Hill-Burton Act provided for
a sharing of responsibilities between federal and state agencies. 2
The Surgeon General had the power to issue regulations prescribing
the conditions under which state plans would be acceptable. 3 In
section 622(f) the Surgeon General was authorized but not required,
to issue regulations requiring certain assurances from the applicants
to the state agencies before approval of any application for a hospi-
tal or hospital addition could be recommended by a state agency."
These assurances, now known as the uncompensated service assur-
ance and the community service assurance," have been the focus of
current Hill-Burton litigation and legislation.
The evolution of the two Hill-Burton assurances has been an
unusual mix of judicial action and legislative reaction. This section
will examine the changes in the Hill-Burton Act and regulations.
The legislative history of the original Hill-Burton Act also will be
examined to ascertain congressional intent regarding the assur-
ances. Finally, the current status of the assurances will be compared
to the original assurances to determine the extent to which they
have been changed by subsequent legislation or regulation.
other medical facilities as may be necessary, in conjunction with existing facilities, to
furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people.
Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (1964). The changes in the declaration of purpose were
intended to provide specifically for modernization and renovation of hospital and health
facilities and not to change the focus of the Act from providing physical facilities to providing
health services themselves. See S. REP. No. 1274, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2800.
10. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946). The regulations promulgated by
the Surgeon General under this section were subject to the approval of the Federal Hospital
Council and the Administrator.
11. Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 269 n.97.
12. Pub. L. No. 79-725, §§ 601-35, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
13. Id. at § 622.
14. Id. at § 622(f).
15. Section 622(f) of the original Hill-Burton Act, provided for the two assurances in
the following way:
Such regulation may require that before approval of any application for a hospital or
addition to a hospital is recommended by a State agency, assurance shall be received by the
State from the applicant that (1) such hospital or addition to a hospital will be made avail-
able to all persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant, without discrimination on
account of race, creed, or color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable
provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group;
and (2) there will be made available in each such hospital or addition to a hospital a reasona-
ble volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be
made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial standpoint.
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A. Changes in the Hill-Burton Obligations
The first regulations promulgated by the Surgeon General in
1947, designed to implement the Act, virtually ignored the two as-
surances." Those portions of the regulations that dealt with the
uncompensated service and community service obligations were, at
best, phrased in precatory language.17 The two assurances continued
to play a very minor role in the impact of the Hill-Burton Act until
the early 1970's when a series of lawsuits drew attention to them."
Prior to 1972, only one change had been made in the Hill-
Burton regulations pertaining to the assurances. The community
services obligation allowed Hill-Burton recipients to maintain segre-
gated facilities." After that clause was'held unconstitutional, Con-
gress in 1964 amended the Act to require grantee hospitals to make
their services available to all persons residing in the facilities' terri-
tories.2 0
In 1972, admittedly in response to a number of lawsuits in
which HEW was joined as a defendant,2 ' HEW issued new regula-
tions regarding the uncompensated service assurance. 22 The 1972
regulations, for the first time, translated a vague congressional de-
sire for assisted facilities to provide a "reasonable volume of services
to people unable to pay"23 into a dollar and cents requirement.
Presumptive compliance levels were established, along with provi-
16. 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-79 (Supp. 1947).
17. Rose, supra note 2, at 172.
18. Id. at 169 n.6 & 172, citing: Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972);
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (defendants' motion
to dismiss granted in part and denied in part); 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied in part); 359 F. Supp. 909
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendants' motion to dismiss denied); Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp.,
61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment granted in part);
Perry v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp. Foundation, Civ. No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28,
1972); OMICA v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 53.62 (Supp. 1947).
20. Rose, supra note 2, at 171 & n.22. The allowance of segregated facilities under the
Hill-Burton Act was held unconstitutional in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The amended portion of the Hill-
Burton Act can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976).
21. Rose, supra note 2, at 172-74. The cases identified by Rose as prompting HEW's
promulgation of the 1972 regulations were: Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972);
Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment granted in part); Perry v. Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp. Foundation,
Civ. No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972); OMICA v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp.
268 (S.D. Fla. 1971); 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied);
See Rose, supra note 2, for a more detailed history of the Hill-Burton Act.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (1975).
23. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
24. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1975).
1472 [Vol. 32:1469
HILL-BURTON FACILITIES
sions for waiver of those compliance levels.2 The regulations also
provided for a means of assessing and enforcing compliance levels,
primarily through state agencies .2
Despite the fact that Congress was silent on the matter, the
greater scope given to the uncompensated service assurance did not
stop with HEW's 1972 regulation. Again in response to judicial ac-
tion HEW amended the 1972 regulations in 1975.27 The amendments
were in particular response to Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center,2 which invalidated a 1972 provision that allowed eligibility
to be determined after services were provided.29 Thus, the 1975
amendments required eligibility to be determined prior to the rendi-
tion of services, except under certain circumstances. 0 These amend-
ments also required grantees to post notices in their facilities in-
forming patients of the availability of uncompensated services.3'
It was not until 1974 that HEW issued new regulations regard-
ing the community service assurance.32 The regulations, promul-
gated in response to Cook v. Ochsner Foundation,33 provided for
state agency administration and monitoring of the assurances." In
keeping with Cook the regulations required assisted facilities to par-
ticipate in many governmental third-party payment programs," but
the facilities could limit the availability of their services to individu-
als based upon the applicant's age, medical indigency" and type of
medical or mental affliction.37 The regulations also established du-
rational limits for the community service obligation: twenty years
for Hill-Burton grant recipients and until the loan was repaid for
loan recipients.3 1 In 1977, again in response to litigation, the regula-
tions were amended to delete the durational limits."
25. Id.
26. Id. § 53.111(i).
27. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (1978) (preface to proposed 1979 regulations-background and
summary of current rules).
28. Id.
29. Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
30. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f) (1978).
31. Id. § 53.111(i).
32. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,955 (1978).
33. Id.
34. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(f) (1976).
35. E.g., Medicaid and Medicare.
36. A medical indigent is one who, while possibly not otherwise indigent, is unable to
pay for hospital or medical care.
37. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(1)(ii) (1976).
38. Id. § 53.113(a).
39. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(a) (1978). The rationale for deletion of durational limits, as
stated in 43 Fed. Reg. 49,955 (1978), was that the courts in Cook v. Ochsner Foundation
Hosp., Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. 1975) and Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
found no statutory basis for a durational limitation of the community service assurance.
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Funding for Title VI was discontinued in 1974.0 In 1975, how-
ever, Congress enacted Title XVI to replace Title VI. Three provi-
sions of Title XVI directly affected Title VI facilities.4 2 Section
1602(6) gave the Secretary of HEW the power to prescribe regula-
tions regarding Title VI facilities' compliance with their assurances;
section 1602 provided for reporting on compliance; and section
1612(c) gave the Secretary investigatory and enforcement powers
and provided for private actions by individuals against facilities to
effect compliance under certain circumstances.43
An examination of Table 1 (Uncompensated Services Regula-
tions) and Table 2 (Community Service Regulations) in the Appen-
dix reveals that the "clarification" of the Hill-Burton assurances,
which began in 1972, continued to mushroom. The 1979 regulations
promulgated by HEW completed the transformation of the Hill-
Burton Act, originally designed to assist states in building hospital
facilities, into an alternative source of Medicaid. The 1979 regula-
tions, promulgated primarily in response to cases such as Lugo v.
Simon" and Newsom v. Vanderbilt University," are so extensive
that tabular form is the only practical method of depicting their
expansive nature.4 1 In Newsom the district court, holding that indi-
gents have a constitutionally protected property interest in free hos-
pital care, declared that the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution required that due process be pro-
vided in the allocation of Hill-Burton Act free care by private hospi-
tals.48 This declaration had a significant impact on the 1979 regula-
tions," profoundly affecting the notice requirements of the regula-
tions."o
The recognition of property rights stemming from the Hill-
Burton assurances illustrates the extent to which the nature of the
40. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (1978).
41. Id. at 49,954-55.
42. Id. at 49,955.
43. Id.
44. 453 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1978). In Lugo, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment that the Secretary of HEW had violated his duties under Title XVI by failing to
issue regulations and requested an injunction compelling the Secretary to perform these
duties. Id. at 686. Although the court did not grant the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, it did note that under 42 U.S.C. § 3000-1(6) the Secretary had a mandatory duty
to issue regulations respecting compliance with the assurances. Id. at 685-86.
45. 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
46. See Table 1 (Uitcompensated Services Regulations) and Table 2 (Community Serv-
ice Regulations) in Appendix.
47. 453 F. Supp. at 422-23.
48. Id. at 423.
49. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,382-99 (1979).
50. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,376 (1979) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.504).
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Hill-Burton assurances has changed since 1946. The question re-
mains whether this transformation was intended by Congress when
it originally included the assurances in the Act.
B. Legislative History of the Hill-Burton Act
When the Hospital Survey and Construction Act was enacted,
Congress recognized the existence of serious economic and geo-
graphic barriers to health services for all Americans,-" but was nev-
ertheless reluctant to commit the Government to a national health
insurance plan.52 On November 19, 1945, President Truman sent a
message to Congress expressing the need for health legislation that
would insure adequate medical care for all.53 President Truman enu-
merated five factors that he felt were needed to achieve a compre-
hensive and modern health program.54 The factors were: first, con-
struction of hospitals and related facilities; second, expansion of
public health, maternal and child health services; third, encourage-
ment of medical education and research; fourth, prepayment of
medical costs in order to assure access to all necessary medical,
hospital and related services; and last, protection against loss of
wages resulting from sickness and disability.5 The Hill-Burton Act
was designed to deal with the first of these five factors and not, as
the legislative history distinctly points out, to serve as a small-scale
national health insurance program."
The Hill-Burton Act as originally introduced by Senator Lister
Hill did not contain language regarding the uncompensated services
and the community service assurances.57 The declaration of purpose
contained in section 601 of the bill was identical to the declaration
in the final Act." The purpose of the Act was to provide the neces-
sary physical facilities for furnishing adequate health services to all
people.5' The provision of services themselves was not the stated
objective.
Senator Hill's opening statement to the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor at the hearings on the proposed Hill-Burton
51. See Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 264.
52. Id.
53. President Truman's Message to Congress, supra note 1.
54. Id. at 1147-52.
55. Id.
56. See Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 266.
57. Proposed Amendments to the Public Health Services Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1945) [hereinafter
cited as 1945 Hearings].
58. Id. at 1; see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
59. 1945 Hearings, supra note 57; see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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Act provides the distinction that identifies the true intent of this
Act. He pointed out that establishing adequate, properly distrib-
uted hospital and public health facilities was the "first step" in
providing a solution to the existent national health problems." This
characterization of the proposed legislation was frequently repeated
in the Senate hearings." For example, Senator Pepper stated that
although a comprehensive medical program would contain at least
two distinct parts, provision of physical facilities and provision of
medical care to all who needed it, this bill dealt only with the first."
Indigents' access to facilities aided under the Act was also a
frequent topic of discussion. It was not contemplated, however, that
the responsibility for providing this care should rest upon the hospi-
tals' financial resources." In fact, there was generalized concern in
the Committee that perhaps maintenance funds for the hospitals
should be provided in the Act.14
In the committee hearing held on March 12, 1945, Dr. Frederick
D. Mott, Chief Medical Officer of the Farm Security Administra-
tion, suggested that safeguards should be placed in the bill to ensure
that recipients carried out the bill's avowed purpose of providing
facilities for furnishing adequate medical services to the people." In
response, Senator Taft suggested that perhaps a hospital that ac-
cepted aid should have an obligation to care for a certain number
of indigent patients." Both Senator Pepper and Dr. Mott replied
that such a requirement might serve to overburden a hospital.,'
Senator Taft responded: "I do not know whether it ought to be a
requirement, although I expect you might modify that through
health insurance, or something of that kind."" Senator Pepper de-
clared that the burden of paying for the care of indigents should rest
upon the public and not upon a particular hospital." Senator Ellen-
der concurred and felt that this was actually what Senator Taft had
60. 1945 Hearings, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Id. passim (for example, see 10, 31, 63, 64, 65, 166, 173).
62. Id. at 64-65.
63. Id. at 70.
64. Id. at 177-78 (Senator Murray, the Chairman, noted that part of the current shor-
tage of hospitals was due to the fact that some facilities lacked operating funds). On Feb.
28, 1945, the hearings were temporarily postponed. Upon resumption, the stated intention of
the Committee was to examine the subject of hospital construction in conjunction with the
subject of financing medical and hospital services. Id. at 178.
65. Id. at 188-89.
66. Id. at 190.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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in mind.70 Ending this discussion, Senator Taft stated, "My interest
in [this bill] is like in a public works bill, just to provide construc-
tion. But beyond that, these facilities must be made available to the
people."71 The 380 pages of testimony received by the Senate com-
mittee on this bill contain no further discussion of Senator Taft's
suggestion. Rather, further discussion regarding care for indigents
focused on the appropriation of state or federal funds for this pur-
pose.72
The uncompensated service language that appears in the final
Act was a product of executive sessions of a subcommittee consider-
ing the Hill-Burton legislation.73 The subcommittee was composed
of Senator Hill, Chairman, and Senators Ellender, Tunnell, La Fol-
lette, and Taft.74 Neither the report of the Senate subcommittee nor
the report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, which considered the Hill-Burton Act, explained further the
70. Id. at 190-91. Senator Ellender declared, "My reason for supporting a bill providing
for Federal aid to build hospitals is to make it easy for the community in which a hospital
may be built to give aid to the indigent." Id. (Emphasis added). It is likely Senator Ellender
reasoned that if part of the burden of hospital construction cost was removed from the
shoulders of the community, then the community would have more funds to channel into
programs for medical care of indigents. Senator Ellender did not state that his reason for
supporting the bill was to require the hospitals to give free care to indigents at the hospitals'
own expense.
71. Id. at 191. Senator Pepper responded to Senator Taft's statement by saying, "That
is the next problem we have got to devote ourselves to - is how to make these facilities
available to the people," reiterating the point that the Hill-Burton Act was to be the first
step followed by subsequent legislation that would complete the long range plan of providing
health care for all citizens. Id.
72. Id. passim (for example, see 211 and 286). Other commentators have reached a
different conclusion based on the colloquy found in the 1945 Hearings at 190-91. See, e.g.,
Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 351 (1973). In that comment, the author concluded that the testimony at the Senate
hearings demonstrated that the Act imposed a duty on recipient hospitals to care for those
unable to pay for medical treatment. Id. at 354. This conclusion was supported by excerpts
quoted from the 1945 Hearings at 190-91. Id. at 354 & n.23. Although such a conclusion may
be drawn from the quoted fragments of the colloquy, the testimony when read in context and
in toto refutes this result.
A frequently cited authority for legislative history on the Hill-Burton Act is Rose, The
Duty of Publicly-Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254, 261-62 (1970). After examining the legislative history Rose draws
only one firm conclusion, that the requirement that grantees afford a reasonable volume of
services for free patient care was contractually binding. Id. at 262. Rose does not conclude
that the inclusion of the above requirement was meant to serve eventually as a surrogate for
national health insurance for indigents. Id. In fact, she concedes, "It might be argued that
Congress (and certainly the Senate Committee members) were clearly aware of the deficien-
cies in the bill in not providing funds for maintenance and operation for hospitals in the
neediest areas and accordingly no provision was made for the indigent in fact." Id.
73. S. REP. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1945).
74. Id. at 1.
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meaning of the assurances."
Commentators have stated that the uncompensated service
obligation was included in the Act as a concession to Senate liberals
who had been unsuccessful in securing the passage of a national
health insurance program." One commentator opined that the in-
clusion of the uncompensated service assurance was a very signifi-
cant concession because Congress expected the assurance to be
given operational effect. This conclusion was based on four factors.
First, a phrase in section 623(a)(4)(D) of the original Hill-Burton
Act provided that a state plan must set forth a hospital construction
program "which meets the requirements . . . for furnishing needed
hospital services to persons unable to pay therefor." 8 Second, the
Act allowed for an exception to the uncompensated service assur-
ance if compliance would not be financially feasible." From these
two points, it was inferred that Congress intended a grantee hospital
to devote some of its resources to providing free care." Although this
conclusion may not be totally erroneous, the conjecture that Con-
gress may have intended assisted facilities to provide some free care
falls far short of the highly regulatory nature the uncompensated
service assurance has assumed in 1979.
Third, it was noted that the legislative history frequently re-
ferred to the need for subsidized or charitable care."' A portion of a
statement of Dr. Smelzer, the President of the American Hospital
Association, was specifically quoted to support this contention. The
colloquy went as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Murray): Could the administrator of this bill compel
a State to see to it that all the people are going to get care in these hospitals,
that they are going to be aided through this system?
Dr. Smelzer: I think if this bill will provide the hospitals, will develop pro-
grams for the construction of such public and nonprofit hospitals, people who
get into them will be taken care of at the local level.
Senator Pepper: You are leaving it to us to find, if we can, some proper way
to aid the people, all the people in getting access to these hospital facilities
and services, and this is considered as a first step and merely as a part of a
whole program. This bill, mainly, is to provide facilities.
Dr. Smelzer: That is correct. 2
75. Id.; H. R. REP. No. 2519, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1558 [hereinafter cited as H. REP. No. 2519]; H. REP. No. 2697, 79th
Cong., 2nd Sess 1, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1571.
76. Rose, supra note 2, at 170; Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 266.
77. Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 267.
78. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 623(a)(4)(D), 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
79. Id. § 622(f).
80. Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 267.
81. Id. at 267-68.
82. Id. at 268; 1945 Hearings, supra note 57, at 30-31.
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Although Dr. Smelzer's statement recognized the need for charita-
ble or subsidized care, he did not view this as a function of the Hill-
Burton Act itself.
Fourth, although the legislative history recognized some need
for reliance on the private nonprofit hospitals' tradition of com-
munity service and charitable care, it also recognized that this was
not adequate to meet the health needs of all Americans." From this
observation the commentator concluded that Congress must have
intended the Hill-Burton legislation to fill the gap in American
health care." What Congress actually intended to accomplish
through the Hill-Burton Act, however, was to take the first step in
making adequate health care available to all Americans. This first
step was to be accomplished by providing adequate physical facili-
ties." With the assurance that private nonprofit hospitals and facili-
ties would continue in their tradition of community service and
charitable care, improved health facilities would necessarily be a
stride in the direction of adequate health care services for all people.
In conclusion, the community service and uncompensated serv-
ice assurances were merely intended to be agreements to treat the
public in general, and indigents in particular, in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. Congress hoped, and through the assurances de-
clared its desire, that aided hospitals would continue to do their best
to serve their communities. Congress feared that aided facilities
would be "diverted to some restricted use not contemplated at the
time of approval of the project."8 This fear, voiced by Dr. Mott, was
the statement to which Senator Taft responded with his now famous
suggestion regarding uncompensated services. Therefore, the inclu-
sion of the two assurances was merely intended to prevent such
diversion.
By giving these assurances Hill-Burton facilities were simply
promising to do their best to serve the people of their communities
in the spirit in which the Hill-Burton Act was promulgated. The
spirit and mood of Congress regarding the true nature of the assur-
ances were captured by the 1947 precatory regulations." Thus, the
transformation that these regulations have undergone is not consis-
tent with the intent of the 79th Congress. The 1979 regulations
issued by HEW reflect the health care policies of 1979. The ultimate
83. Rosenblatt, supra note 2, at 268.
84. Id.
85. See H. R. REP No. 2519, supra note 75.
86. 1945 Hearings, supra note 57, at 189-90.
87. It is reasonable to believe that the Surgeon General had a more accurate concept
in 1947 of what the 79th Congress intended by the inclusion of the two assurances than HEW
does in 1979.
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question, therefore, is whether the aided facilities can be required
to fulfill obligations vastly different from those they agreed to per-
form when they accepted aid under the Hill-Burton Act of 1946.
1H. THE PROTECTION OF CONTRACT RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACT
CLAUSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A contractual relationship, and its attendant reasonable expec-
tations of the contracting parties, is afforded some constitutional
protection from governmental interference. The sources of this pro-
tection are the contract clause and the fifth amendment due process
clause of the United States Constitution.
The contract clause prohibits states from impairing existing
contractual obligations."8 This restraint, however, is limited to legis-
lation promulgated by the states." Although no explicit language in
the Constitution protects private contracts from federal legislation,
the fifth amendment due process clause's protection of property
rights"n has been interpreted as shielding private contracts from
interference by the federal government." The fourteenth amend-
ment imposes the fifth amendment's due process guarantee upon
the states.92
Many commentators feel that the same standard is applicable
to the determination whether retroactive legislation has violated the
contract clause or the due process clause." The cases support this
88. The contract clause provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall . .. pass any...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
89. G. GuNTHER, CONsTrtIoNAL LAW 615 (9th ed. 1975).
90. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be . .. deprived
of . .. property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Although the same balancing test,
weighing private loss against public gain, has been used by many courts to determine a
deprivation of property without due process and a taking of property without just compensa-
tion, the two fifth amendment guarantees are not synonymous. One commentator has stated,
"A taking without compensation can be corrected by payment, but a governmental action
that is arbitrary or serves no valid public purpose must be voided." Note, Balancing Private
Loss Against Public Gain To Test for A Violation of Due Process Or A Taking Without Just
Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315, 326 (1979). The analysis is a two step operation. First
and foremost, the government's action must meet the requirements of substantive due pro-
cess. Only when this is accomplished is the question asked whether compensation is constitu-
tionally required, and if so, what is just compensation. No attempt, however, will be made
to distinguish the two fifth amendment protections in this Note.
91. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869), the Court recognized the due
process clause of the fifth amendment as "kindred in spirit to that which forbids legislation
impairing the obligation of contracts; but, unlike that, it is addressed directly and solely to
the National government." Id. at 623. Hepburn was later overruled on different grounds in
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). See also L. TRIBE, AmmcAN CONSTITUIONAL LAw
465 n.1 (1978).
92. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); TRIBE, supra note 91, at 567.
93. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 91, at 465 n.1; Hale, The Supreme Court and the
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contention." Thus, this section will explore both contract clause and
due process clause cases to find that standard.
A retroactive statute has been defined as "one which gives to
preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it
would have had without the passage of the statute."" A statute that
does not purport to have effect prior to its enactment can still be
retrospective if for example, it alters preexisting rights or obliga-
tions." Retroactive or retrospective statutes have traditionally been
considered suspect. 7 Several rationales have been offered to support
this characterization. The most fundamental rationale is that one
should be able to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the
legal consequences." Therefore, to protect and preserve settled ex-
pectations, greater scrutiny should be given to retrospective laws."
Another reason for treating retroactive legislation as inherently sus-
pect is that issuing such legislation adjudicates rights of known
individuals,""' a function that is best reserved to the judiciary. 0
Discussing the effect that uncertainty of contract can have on so-
ciety, Chief Justice Marshall stated in Ogden v. Saunders,'02 "This
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to
Contract Clause: III, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 890-91 (1944); Hochman, The Supreme Court And
The Constitutionality Of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 695 (1960).
94. E.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940). In Veix, after holding that a
state legislative act did not violate the contract clause, the Court did not even think it
necessary to address the fourteenth amendment due process challenge. Id. at 41. In El Paso
Justice Black dissented from what he viewed to be "the Court's balancing away the plain
guarantee of Art. I, § 10 . . . a balancing which results in the . . . violation of the equally
plain guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth,
that 'private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.'" 379
U.S. at 517. But cf. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 251 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). In Allied Steel Justice Brennan asserted that the majority analyzed the
case in the wrong constitutional framework when it proceeded under the contract clause. He
felt that the proper analysis would have been under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In his dissent Justice Brennan alludes to the idea that a violation of the contract
clause and the due process clause are analytically different, but he never specifically identi-
fies the difference. Id.
95. Hochman, supra note 93, at 692. Hochman pointed out that a classic example of a
retroactive statute is one which reaches back to an already completed transaction and at-
taches new rights and obligations. Id.
96. Id. Hochman noted that the Supreme Court has treated the terms retroactive and
retrospective interchangeably. Id. at 692 n.1.
97. Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080 (1st
Cir. 1977); Hochman, supra note 93, at 692.
98. Hochman, supra note 93, at 692.
99. See Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d at 1080.
100. Id.
101. Hochman, supra note 93, at 693.
102. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private
faith."103 Thus the value placed on certainty in contractual obliga-
tions in this country is a restraining force against retrospective state
and federal legislation.
To invoke the protection of the contract clause or the due pro-
cess clause against retroactive legislation, several factors must be
assessed. First, in order to invoke the contract clause, the private
right affected must be a contract right. 04 To invoke due process
protections the private right must be a vested property right. 0
Valid contracts and the rights that arise therefrom are vested prop-
erty rights.0 Although many vested rights are not contractual in
origin, the focus of this section will be on vested rights arising from
contractual relations.
Once it is determined that a property right is affected, the next
level of analysis is whether the legislation impairs the contract. A
contract is found to be impaired when a party is deprived of the
benefit of his contract.o'0 It is not necessary that the legislation
completely destroy the contract.' Impairment can be found when
a law substantially reduces the contractual rights."9o
In determining whether a contract is impaired, it is essential to
know the terms of the contract, especially the consideration."0 The
laws in existence at the time of execution in the places of execution
and performance are usually considered to be part of the contract,
even if not expressly incorporated."' Contracts involving an area
that is heavily regulated by the government are often held to incor-
porate future legislation on the subject.112
Even when it is established that a property or contract right has
been impaired by retroactive legislation, the constitutional protec-
tions are not absolute. The contract clause's prohibition that "No
State shall. . . pass any . . . Law," is not as absolute as it may
seem.' The same is true of the restraint placed on retroactive legis-
103. Id. at 355.
104. See TRIBE, supra note 91, at 465.
105. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S.
434, 442 (1932); South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 515,
520 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. South Windsor Convalescent Home,
Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
107. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 583, 591 (1908).
108. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 279 (1969).
109. Id.
110. See FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
111. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934).
112. E.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. at 38.
113. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426-30.
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lation by the due process clause.'"
Various factors have been considered by courts determining the
constitutionality of retroactive statutes."' These factors can be
characterized as first, the legislature's justification for retroactive
legislation; second, the degree of impairment of the contract; and
last, the nature of the rights affected."' These factors provide an
analytical framework for determining how much protection from
governmental interference a contract will be given.
A. A Period of Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that constitu-
tional restrictions placed on retroactive legislation affecting con-
tract rights are modified by police or paramount powers."' The
scrutiny given to legislative acts, however, to determine if they were
a reasonable exercise of paramount or police powers has varied."8
In 1922, Justice Holmes stated in his majority opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, "When [the fifth amendment's]
seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the quali-
fication more and more until at last private property disappears.""'
In Pennsylvania Coal, a tight rein was placed on police power. Con-
sequently, the Court found the legislative abrogation of preexisting
rights unjustifiable.' Although the legislation in question did pro-
mote personal safety, the Court recognized that personal safety
could be achieved by other means.121 The private contract in ques-
tion was found to be greatly impaired because, if the Kohler Act 22
114. See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947).
115. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). The Court
looked at the extent of the diminution in property value, the public interest served, and the
private right affected.
116. Another commentator grouped these factors into the following categories: First,
the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute, second, the extent to
which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted preenactment right, and last the nature
of the right that the statute alters. Hochman, supra note 93, at 697.
117. See, e.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. at 107; East N.Y. Savings Bank v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945). Police powers are considered to be the power to promulgate legisla-
tion that is reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general
welfare of the community. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558
(1914). Paramount powers are the essential powers of Congress.
118. See Hochman, supra note 93.
119. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
120. Id. at 416.
121. Id. at 414.
122. The Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute approved May 27, 1921, forbade mining
of coal in such ways as to cause subsidence of any structure used for human habitation, with
certain exceptions. The plaintiff owned a parcel of land to which the coal company in 1878
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applied, mining coal would become commercially impractical.'2 For
constitutional purposes, such impairment was deemed to have de-
stroyed the contractual right. 124
In Lynch v. United States retroactive legislation was not al-
lowed to abrogate the rights created by insurance policies issued by
the federal government pursuant to the War Risk Insurance Act of
1917.1n The Act provided that, if payment were refused under the
policy, the beneficiary had the right to sue the Government.128 In
1933, however, the Economy Act withdrew the Government's con-
sent to be sued.'2 Abrogating contracts in an attempt to lessen
government expenditures, even in times of economic depression,
was found to be insufficient justification.128 Although a distinction
between impairing contract rights and changing remedies is often
drawn, the Lynch Court equated the Government's removal of the
beneficiaries' remedy with a repudiation of the contract itself.'2"
In the same term in which Lynch was decided, the Court was
presented with another contractual impairment case. In Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, however, private con-
tracts, rather than governmental contracts, were impaired by legis-
lation.'" The Court held that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law was not repugnant to the contract clause or the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Minnesota's justification for
passage of a law that admittedly impaired contracts was the exist-
ence of an economic emergency. 3 2 Noting that the emergency did
not create the state's power to impair contracts, the Court stated
that an emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of the
power.1"
In Blaisdell, the Court specifically recognized that the eco-
nomic interests of a state may justify the exercise of its police pow-
had reserved the right to remove all coal. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity to prevent
the coal company from mining under his property. Id. at 412.
123. Id. at 414.
124. Id.
125. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
126. Id. at 575.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 580. Justice Brandeis, in Lynch, quoted from the Sinking Fund Cases, 99
U.S. 700, 719 (1879): "'The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are
individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong
and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a
municipality or a citizen.'" 292 U.S. at 580.
129. Id.
130. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
131. Id. at 447-48.
132. Id. at 409.
133. Id. at 426.
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ers, 3 1 but in Lynch economic justifications did not suffice."' Per-
haps the reconciling elements are the differences in the extent and
nature of the impairment of the contracts and the rights involved
in each case. The extent of the impairment of the contract was more
limited in Blaisdell than in Lynch. The Court in Blaisdell noted
that legislation must be addressed to a legitimate end and the mea-
sures taken must be reasonable and appropriate to accomplish that
end.'" In Blaisdell the legislation was appropriately limited to deal
with the economic emergency and, as a result, the extent of the
impairment of contracts was kept to a minimum. The Mortgage
Moratorium Law was to remain in effect "only during the continu-
ance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935."1m1 In
addition, mortgagors were to pay mortgagees the rental value of the
property plus interest upon the indebtedness during the extended
time that the Act provided to redeem the property."' No such limi-
tations were found in the legislation challenged in Lynch.'"3 The
nature of the rights that the Mortgage Moratorium Law affected in
Blaisdell were contractual rights between private individuals. In
Lynch, however, the contractual obligations impaired existed be-
tween the federal government itself and private individuals. This is
a significant factor in determining the constitutional validity of
retroactive legislation. The Court in Blaisdell based its conclusion
that the legislation was addressed to a legitimate end upon the fact
that the legislation was not for the mere advantage of particular
individuals, but for the protection of an important societal inter-
est. 4' When one has the power to legislatively abrogate its own
contractual obligations, the motives behind the legislation naturally
become more suspect and demand greater scrutiny.
The importance of whether legislation impairs private or
government contracts became more apparent in cases dealing with
the Gold Clause Resolution.' 1 In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
134. Id. at 428.
135. 292 U.S. at 580.
136. 290 U.S. at 438.
137. Id. at 416.
138. Id. at 416-17.
139. In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 432 (1934), the Supreme Court also
recognized the importance of appropriately limiting legislation to the emergency situation
that necessitated its promulgation. In Thomas, a state statute retroactively exempting insur-
ance policies from writs of garnishment was found to violate the contract clause.
140. 290 U.S. at 445.
141. The Gold Clause Resolution declared that "'Every obligation, heretofore or hereaf-
ter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein or made with respect
thereto, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which
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Railroad42 the Gold Clause Resolution was upheld as applied to
private contracts. Yet in Perry v. United States,'' the Supreme
Court concluded that the same was not true regarding the Govern-
ment's own contracts. The Court stated:
There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or
interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise
of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repu-
diate the substance of its own engagements . . . . 4
The extent to which a legislative act impairs a contract was
given great weight in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh."' In
Kavanaugh a municipal commission issued bonds. State statutes
that originally made these bonds acceptable security were subse-
quently changed to such a great extent that the security was im-
paired.146 The Court recognized, as it did in Lynch, that changing a
party's remedy under the contract can have the effect of unconstitu-
tionally abrogating the party's contractual rights."' The changes in
the statutes were found to be "an oppressive and unnecessary de-
struction" of almost all of the incidents that made the bonds attrac-
tive and secure.'" Also, the changes were executed with "studied
indifference" to the interests of the bondholders.' The standard
enunciated in Kavanaugh, delineating the extent of impairment
necessary to find a violation of the contract clause, was adopted in
many subsequent decisions.5 0 An important limitation of that stan-
dard, often overlooked, is the Court's statement that this was an
outermost limit only and did not exclude the possibility that an
unconstitutional impairment could be found within narrower
bounds.'5'
B. A Period of Deference
For the next forty years, the Supreme Court continued to exam-
ine the same factors in assessing the validity of retroactive legisla-
at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.' " Norman v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 292 (1935).
142. 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
143. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
144. Id. at 350-51.
145. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
146. The Court noted that the obligation of a contract includes the laws in force at the
time of its making. Id. at 60.
147. Id. at 60-61.
148. Id. at 62.
149. Id. at 60.
150. See, e.g., East N.Y. Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945); Faitoute Iron
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515 (1942).
151. 295 U.S. at 60.
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tion. Significantly, less importance was given to the factors of de-
gree of impairment and the nature of the rights affected. At the
same time, more deference was given to the government's justifica-
tion for the legislation.15 2
In Veix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Association"3 the
Court followed Blaisdell. The limitation of the legislation to the
emergency and the consequential minimization of contractual im-
pairment that existed in Blaisdell, however, were absent in Veix.
The regulations in Veix were not limited in time to the emergency
situation, nor did the Court seem to consider this important.", The
extent of the impairment caused by the legislation in Veix was
justified to some extent by what the Court considered should have
been the contracting parties' reasonable expectations. The legisla-
tion in Veix dealt with savings and loan associations that had been
regulated by the state for many years before the petitioner pur-
chased his shares."5s The Court reasoned that when a person enters
a field that is already regulated in the aspect to which he now
objects, the person actually contracts subject to further legislation
on the same topic." In East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn"17 the
legislation in question was a mortgage moratorium similar to that
in Blaisdell. Nevertheless, in East New York Savings Bank the mor-
atorium, due to its yearly extensions, was not limited in time to the
existence of the emergency that prompted its enactment. The ab-
sence of the limitation did not, however, prevent the Court from
finding the legislation constitutional."' No "studied indifference" to
the interests of the mortgagee was found as in Kavanaugh."I Defer-
ence was given to the judgment of the legislature that continuation
of the moratorium was necessary.
In 1958, the Court in FHA v. Darlington, Inc. held that the due
process clause was not violated by a section added in 1954 to the
152. The same shift in the Supreme Court's level of deference to legislative judgment
is seen in the economic substantive due process cases. The Adair-Lochner-Coppage doctrine
of strict scrutiny and interventionism pervaded the Supreme Court's decision making until
1934. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). Then in 1934, beginning with Nebbia v. New
York, a deferential philosophy engulfed the Court. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156
(1973).
153. 310 U.S. 32 (1940). As in Blaisdell, the justification for the retroactive legislation
in Veix was economic.
154. Id. at 39.
155. Id. at 38.
156. Id.
157. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 234.
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National Housing Act."'0 The Court reached this decision because
it felt that the addition to the Act was not retroactive and no vested
rights were impaired."' The Court reasoned that the addition
merely clarified congressional intent and, as a consequence, did not
alter preexisting rights.182 Concluding the majority opinion, Justice
Douglas stated, "[T]hose who do business in the regulated field
cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end. Invocation of the Due
Process Clause to protect the rights asserted here would make the
ghost of Lochner v. New York walk again.""'
In his dissent in Darlington, Justice Frankfurter recognized
that curative statute cases typically upheld the retroactive validity
of legislation adversely affecting an existing interest.'" For example,
retroactive, curative statutes have traditionally been upheld if they
were designed to cure defects in an administrative system in order
to effectively carry out the original legislative intent."' The ration-
ale used to sustain retroactive, curative statutes has been that they
typically entail only remedial modifications,"' and the rights they
do affect are not equitably vested.6 7 Justice Frankfurter, however,
found that Darlington did not fall within that class."' Moreover,
Justice Frankfurter had less fear of the Lochner ghost than Justice
Douglas, reasoning that the Lynch decision demanded the invoca-
tion of the due process clause to protect the rights asserted in
Darlington. "
In City of El Paso v. Simmons the Supreme Court gave unprec-
edented deference to the legislature by allowing the State of Texas
to impair the State's own contracts. 70 The Court relied heavily on
the reasoning of Blaisdell without noticing, as Justice Black's dis-
sent pointed out, the striking differences between the two cases.'7
160. 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
161. Id. at 90-91. In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the Court also found that
the petitioner was not deprived of a vested property right.
162. 358 U.S. at 90-91.
163. Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted). See note 151 supra.
164. 358 U.S. at 93.
165. See Hochman, supra note 93, at 704.
166. See 358 U.S. at 93.
167. See Hochman, supra note 93, at 705.
168. 358 U.S. at 93.
169. Id.
170. 379 U.S. 497 (1965). The challenged statute in this case amended an earlier statute
that allowed a purchaser or his vendee to reinstate their claim to land forfeited to the state
by paying the amount of interest due. The amendment limited the right of reinstatement to
five years from the date of forfeiture. Id.
171. 379 U.S. at 523-27. Justice Black distinguished Blaisdell from El Paso on the basis
of private versus government contracts and limited versus total impairment. Id.
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In El Paso, not only was the degree of impairment greater than in
Blaisdell, but also the justification for the legislation was signifi-
cantly weaker. Although Blaisdell recognized that economic inter-
ests of the state could justify interference with contracts, 17 2 the eco-
nomic needs in El Paso-efficient utilization of land and revenues
for the school fund 73-were not equivalent in nature to those created
by the depression of the 1930's that supported Blaisdell.
The Court's deference to legislatures was again demonstrated
in 1976 in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co." In Usery the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972,115 which amended Title IV of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,176 was upheld as not
violative of due process even though it imposed unexpected liability
on mining companies for past, completed acts that were legally
proper at the time done. 77 The Act required operators to compen-
sate former employees who had terminated their work in the indus-
try before the Act was passed.78 The Court stated that legislative
acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life are pre-
sumed to be constitutional unless proven arbitrary."' The fact that
a legislative act upsets settled expectations does not of itself render
the act unconstitutional.8 0 The Court considered the expectations
of the operators at the time they employed the former employees,
but concluded that even if the liability provided in the Act was not
expected, the liability imposed was a rational measure. 8' Once the
legislative act was found to be rational, the Supreine Court refused
to second-guess the legislature concerning the wisdom of the chosen
scheme."' Thus, a very deferential judicial attitude toward legisla-
tive judgment was confirmed in Usery.
C. A Return to Scrutiny
After many years of minimal significance, Lynch was again
recognized as a restraint on governmental abrogation of contracts in
172. 290 U.S. at 437.
173. 379 U.S. at 515-16.
174. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
175. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-45 (Supp. 1979).
176. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-36 (1971).
177. 428 U.S. 1.
178. Id. at 14-15.
179. Id. at 15.
180. Id. at 16.
181. Id. at 18. The Court concluded that imposition of liability on the operators for
disabilities caused by employment in the past was a rational method of distributing the costs
of the employees' disabilities to those who had profited from the employees' labor. Id.
182. Id. at 18-19.
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Larionoff v. United States.8 1 In Larionoff the Court of Appeals, and
later the Supreme Court, found no congressional intent to deprive
servicemen of vested rights.' Although these decisions did not rely
on Lynch, "'" both courts recognized that if the legislation had been
intended by Congress to deprive servicemen of vested rights, Lynch
would have presented serious constitutional questions."'
Two months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Larionoff,
the Court revitalized the contract clause in United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey."7 The Court explicitly recognized important distinc-
tions that had been previously observed in early contract clause and
due process cases."'8 The Court found that a different level of scru-
tiny should be applied when the contract impaired is a purely pri-
vate one and when the contract is one involving the governmental
body itself." The Court also concluded that legislation which ad-
justs the rights between private contracting parties must be reason-
able and of a character appropriate to the public purpose that justi-
fied its adoption"' and noted that deference would be given to the
legislative judgment on this matter."' The Court added that legisla-
tion which impairs a governmental contract must also be both rea-
sonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."2 Be-
cause the interest of the state itself is at stake, however, the Court
reasoned that complete deference should not be given to the legisla-
tive assessment of reasonableness and necessity."' Therefore, con-
trary to Usery, "I the Court decided that it should examine various
methods of achieving the legislative goal to determine if less drastic
means would suffice. 5
In United States Trust the Court held that a retroactive statute
that repealed a security provision which benefited government
bondholders unconstitutionally impaired the government's obliga-
tion."' The reasoning of the Court is helpful in assessing the full
impact of the Court's decision upon scrutiny of government con-
183. 533 F.2d 1167, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
184. 431 U.S. at 879; 533 F.2d at 1180.
185. See 431 U.S. 864; 533 F.2d 1167.
186. 431 U.S. at 879; 533 F.2d at 1179-80.
187. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
188. Id. at 22-26.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 22.
191. Id. at 23.
192. Id. at 25.
193. Id. at 26.
194. 428 U.S. at 18-19.
195. See 431 U.S. at 29-30.
196. Id. at 1.
1490 [Vol. 32:1469
HILL-BURTON FACILITIES
tracts. Before assessing the reasonableness and necessity of the leg-
islation, the Court made an initial inquiry into the state's ability to
enter into an agreement that might limit the state's power to act in
the future."' The Court noted that, because a state may not compro-
mise an essential attribute of its sovereign powers, the contract
clause would not protect a contract affecting such powers." Govern-
mental contracts that are financial in nature, however, do not com-
promise a state's sovereign powers.'" The Court determined that the
contract in United States Trust concerned a financial obligation
that fell outside the reserve powers the government could not con-
tract away.2" The involvement of money, however, does not auto-
matically render the transaction financial. Instead, the Court will
look beyond the title of the contract to determine how it actually
restrains the government. 20 1 A state will not be allowed to evade a
legitimate financial obligation simply because it would prefer to
spend the money to promote the public good. 20 2
In United States Trust, mass transportation, energy conserva-
tion, and environmental protection were recognized as legitimate
and important goals, but were insufficient justification to allow the
government to impair its own contract. 203 Deciding that the plan
chosen by the legislature was not necessary to achieve the stated
goals, the Court also determined that the contracts were impaired
to an unnecessary degree.2 4 In fact, the Court found that the goals
could have been achieved without modifying the covenants at all. 201
The impairment was not justified merely because it was the least
expensive and most convenient option for the government. 2os
Another important element was revealed when the Court recon-
ciled United States Trust with El Paso. The statute amended in El
Paso had effects that were unforeseeable and unintended by the
legislature.2 o Yet in United States Trust the conditions that called
for the challenged legislation were foreseeable.2 8 The Court indi-
197. Id. at 23.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 24-25.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 25. An example cited by the Court was, "[A] revenue bond might be
secured by the State's promise to continue operating the facility in question; yet such a
promise surely could not validly be construed to bind the State never to close the facility for
health or safety reasons." Id. at 25.
202. Id. at 29.
203. Id. at 32.
204. Id. at 30.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 30-31.
207. Id. at 31.
208. Id. at 31-32.
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cated that it would be proper to allow a statute to be amended only
if it served to restrict a party to those gains he reasonably expected
from the contract.' In other words, if a statute is changed but does
not defeat a party's reasonable expectations, both the extent of the
impairment and the private rights affected are in fact minimal. 21"
Coupling the closer scrutiny given to a legislature's justification
for altering its own contractual obligations with the requirement
that the legislature minimize the extent of impairment of private
rights, the Supreme Court in United States Trust announced a dif-
ferent level of protection for contractual rights than it had offered
in the past forty years. Some commentators feel that United States
Trust is consistent with precedent,2 " while other commentators be-
lieve that it is an aberrational case212 and question whether it genu-
inely signaled a resurgence of scrutiny by the Supreme Court.213 Two
decisions of the Supreme Court since United States Trust indicate,
however, that the constitutional protections afforded contracts by
the due process clause and the contract clause are truly revitalized.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Larionoff, handed down two
months after United States Trust, hinted at the revitalization of the
due process clause as a source of protection from impairment of
contracts by retroactive legislation. 214 Because the Court found no
contractual impairment, however, it did not face the issue
squarely. 215 The dicta in Larionoff does indicate that the reasoning
of Lynch is not to be forgotten. 21 1
lii Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus the application of a
Minnesota statute to the appellant was held violative of the con-
tract clause.217 Because cases concerning impairment of private con-
tracts commonly exhibit deference to legislative judgment, it is sig-
209. See id. at 31.
210. The Court rejected the construction that Kavanaugh had enunciated a "total
destruction" test. Id. at 26-27. An unconstitutional impairment of contract can be found even
if the contract is not totally destroyed.
211. See, e.g., Note, Repeal of Covenant Providing Security of Municipal Bond Violates
Contract Clause: United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 31 RurGERs L. REv. 786 (1978).
212. See, e.g., 55 J. Uns. L. 200 (1977).
213. See, e.g., 17 WAsHBuRN L.J. 416 (1978).
214. See 431 U.S. at 879.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). The Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, Minn. Stat.
H§ 181B.01-.17 (1974), made a private employer of 100 or more employees, at least one of
whom had to be a Minnesota resident, who provided pension benefits under a plan meeting
the requirements of § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code subject to a "pension funding charge"
if he either terminated the plan or closed a Minnesota office. The charge was only assessed if
the pension funds were inadequate to cover full pensions for all employees who had worked
for the employer for at least ten years. Id. at 238.
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nificant that the Allied Steel Court relied on cases that were not
totally deferential to legislatures. 2 18 The Court noted five factors in
Blaisdell that justified sustaining the constitutionality of the chal-
lenged legislation. 2 1' These factors were: First, the act was prompted
by an emergency; second, the act served a basic societal interest,
rather than the interest of favored groups; third, the relief was ap-
propriately tailored to the emergency it was designed to meet;
fourth, the imposed conditions were reasonable; and last, the legis-
lation was limited to the duration of the emergency. 20 The Court
next examined the decisions in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,22'
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,222 Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Association" and United States Trust,224 all of which found chal-
lenged legislation unconstitutional. 2 6 Applying the principles de-
rived from these cases, the Allied Steel Court found the presump-
tion favoring legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasona-
bleness of the particular measure could not stand. 28 The Court held
that the legislation, which nullified express terms of contractual
obligations and imposed a completely unexpected liability in poten-
tially disabling amounts, was unjustified. 2 27 The legislation, promul-
gated to secure pension plans for Minnesota residents in the face of
plant closures and pension plan terminations, '2 attempted to deal
with a narrow class rather than a broad societal interest. 2 29 Also, no
desperate economic emergency existed as in Blaisdell.2o Finally, the
legislation was not a temporary alteration of contractual obliga-
tions, but a severe and permanent change.23I Thus, the five Blaisdell
factors were absent. A less deferential judicial attitude was revealed
not only by the holding in Allied Steel, but also by the precedent
relied upon.
As a result of United States Trust, Larionoff, and Allied Steel,
contractual obligations once again are truly afforded protection
218. See 438 U.S. 234.
219. Id. at 242.
220. Id.
221. 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
222. 295 U.S. 56 (1935). The Court in Allied Steel also rejected the notion that
Kavanaugh established the principle that an impairment must be done without moderation
or reason or in a spirit of oppression to be unconstitutional. 438 U.S. at 250.
223. 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
224. 438 U.S. at 243-44.
225. Id. at 243-44. El Paso was relegated to a footnote in Allied Steel. Id. at 243 n.14.
226. Id. at 247.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 247-48.
229. Id. at 248.
230. Id. at 249.
231. Id. at 250.
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from impairment by retroactive legislation. While the Court may
give some deference to legislative judgment when private contracts
are considered, Allied Steel declares that deference does not mean
the Court will abdicate its role as guardian of constitutional liber-
ties. United States Trust assures that even closer scrutiny will be
given to legislation when a governmental body seeks to alter its own
obligations. While the contract clause and the due process clause
will not be allowed to completely tie the hands of legislatures in
fulfilling their sovereign duty to protect the general welfare, they are
not mere shadows of protections of times past.
IV. THE 1979 REGULATIONS: GOVERNMENTAL IMPAIRMENT OF ITS OWN
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
When facilities received Hill-Burton funds, they entered into a
contractual relationship with the state and federal governments.2 12
In consideration for the receipt of the federal funds, the facilities
agreed to construct their projects in accordance with the pertinent
regulations and to comply with the assurances they made in their
applications to the state agency."3 The two assurances were in-
tended to make the facilities available without discrimination on
account of race, creed, or color to all persons residing in the service
area of the facilities and to furnish a reasonable volume of free
patient care."4 The facilities' consideration has been altered by gov-
ernmental action many times since the first Hill-Burton regulations
were promulgated in 1947. Although not every change in a contrac-
tual obligation impairs the contract, examination of the changes
made in the Hill-Burton assurances demonstrates that the contracts
of Hill-Burton recipients have been impaired.
In determining whether a contract is impaired, it is essential to
know what the contract and the consideration actually encom-
passed.23 The consideration the assisted facilities promised was to
fulfill the two assurances. The content of the two assurances, and
therefore the content of the contract, was embodied in the 1947
regulations because laws that are in existence at the time and the
place of the making of the contract are part of the contract even if
not expressly included. 23 8
A contract does not have to be totally destroyed in order to be
232. See Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1972).
233. Id.
234. 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.62-63 (Supp. 1947).
235. See FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
236. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 429-30.
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impaired in the constitutional sense.2 37 For example, changes that
derogate from substantial contractual rights can impair a con-
tract.238 In Kavanaugh numerous small changes, considered to-
gether, were found to impair a contract because cumulatively they
destroyed nearly all the incidents of attractiveness to the contract.239
An examination of Tables 1 and 2 reveals an identical situation in
the case of Hill-Burton recipients.
The Hill-Burton regulations issued subsequently to those pro-
mulgated in 1947, particularly the 1979 regulations, impaired the
Government's contracts with Hill-Burton facilities due to the regu-
lations' retroactive effect. The regulations were retroactive because
they altered preexisting rights and obligations.2 40
As previously discussed, the due process clause and the con-
tract clause protect contracts from impairment by retroactive legis-
lation. This protection provided by the Constitution, however, is not
absolute and must give way to certain exceptions such as curative
legislation, contracts in which the government has compromised its
sovereign powers, and contracts that are impaired by legislation
that is a reasonable and necessary exercise of a governmental body's
police power.
The regulations promulgated by HEW do not fit within the
curative statute exception. The rationales which support the consti-
tutionality of this type of legislation are: The government should be
allowed to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their administra-
tion24! and such statutes merely do what should be within the rea-
sonable expectations of people contracting in highly regulated
fields.2 2 These rationales, however, do not justify the changes in the
regulations. In light of the legislative history, the recent regulations
do not implement the true intent of the 79th Congress,'24 nor do they
simply make "small repairs" to cure inadvertent defects.2 4 More-
over, when Hill-Burton grantees entered into their contractual rela-
237. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. at 279.
238. Id.
239. 295 U.S. at 62.
240. See Hochman, supra note 93, at 692.
241. Id. at 705.
242. See, e.g., FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. at 91; Adams Nursing Home of Wil-
liamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d at 1081.
243. The question whether the 1979 HEW regulations are so different from the legisla-
tive intent that they are ultra vires is a viable issue. That issue, however, is beyond the scope
of this Note. As stated in Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978) "[TJhe
actions of the government representative on which a taking claim is premised must be author-
ized either expressly or by necessary implication, by some valid enactment of Congress." Id.
at 819.
244. See 548 F.2d at 1081.
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tionship with the federal government, hospital construction was not
a highly regulated area. The grantees were justifiably unaware that
approximately twenty-five years later the focus of their contract
with the Government would shift from hospital construction to a
Medicaid surrogate.
Application of the standards recently enunciated in United
States Trust and Allied Steel requires the conclusion that the 1979
Hill-Burton regulations are beyond constitutional boundaries. The
impaired contracts did not involve the surrender of a sovereign right
by the federal government. Nor is the legislation justified as a rea-
sonable and necessary exercise of legislative power appropriate to
accomplish a public purpose.
Although a legislature cannot contractually surrender an essen-
tial attribute of its sovereignty,45 a contract essentially financial in
nature does not, in and of itself, compromise sovereign powers.2 6
The contract that exists between the federal government and the
Hill-Burton grantees was created to provide for the construction of
needed health care facilities. The mere fact that the Government
intended to improve the health and welfare of Americans, does not
bring the contract under the umbrella of sovereign powers. The
nature of the contractual obligations must be examined, as opposed
to the subject matter of the contract, to determine if sovereign pow-
ers have been compromised. The only way in which the federal
government bound itself to the Hill-Burton grantees was mone-
tarily. Because its contractual obligations were essentially financial
in nature, no essential attribute of the Government's sovereign pow-
ers was surrendered. Because the federal government was free to
contract as it did, some restraints were consequently placed on the
legislature's power to subsequently alter these contracts.
If the legislature retroactively impairs its contractual obliga-
tions, the impairment must be both reasonable and necessary to
effectuate an important public purpose. 247 Because the Govern-
ment's self-interest is at stake when the regulations promulgated by
HEW impair the Government's contractual obligations, complete
deference should not be given to the legislative assessment of rea-
sonableness and necessity.248 Three major factors should be bal-
anced to determine whether the challenged legislation is both rea-
sonable and necessary: the legislature's justification for its action,
245. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 23.
246. Id. at 24.
247. See id. at 25.
248. Id. at 26.
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the nature and extent of the impairment, and the nature of the
rights affected.
Arguably HEW's new regulations are justified by the need to
promote adequate health care for all Americans. Admittedly, this
is an important goal, but, as in United States Trust, in which mass
transportation, energy conservation, and environmental protection
were advanced as justifications for the challenged legislation, 249 this
important goal does not rise to a level that would justify the conse-
quent impairment of contracts. In United States Trust the Court
stated, "Thus a State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial
obligations simply because it would prefer to spend the money to
promote the public good rather than the private welfare of its credi-
tors."n0 In the case of Hill-Burton grantees, the Government has
already spent its money. What it seeks to do now is to get more for
its money by increasing the grantees' obligations and thereby
avoiding the expenditure of more money to further its goal of im-
proved health care. The Court noted in Lynch that Congress is
without power to reduce its expenditures by abrogating contracts.2'
The need to provide health care for all Americans does not give the
legislature the freedom to impair its own contracts in any manner
it desires.
The nature and extent of the impairment inflicted by the 1979
regulations is severe. It is so far-reaching that the actual substance
of the two assurances given by Hill-Burton grantees has been
changed. When made, in light of the 1947 regulations, the assur-
ances were statements of the good faith intentions of the recipients
to do their best to meet the needs of their communities. An exami-
nation of the demands of the 1979 regulations reveals the altered
nature of the assurances. A few representative examples illustrate
this point. Not only has the grantees' promise to provide a
"reasonable amount" of free care been given a dollar sign (by the
1972 regulations),N2 but now a plus mark has been added. The 1979
regulations provide that the "reasonable volume" dollar amount be
adjusted upwards for inflation."3 Deficits in compliance must now
be made up and adjusted for inflation."4 Both the Hill-Burton Act,
enacted in 1946, and the 1947 regulations specifically included a
provision allowing for a waiver when compliance with the uncom-
249. Id. at 28-29.
250. Id. at 29.
251. 292 U.S. at 580.
252. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d).
253. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,376 (1979) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)).
254. Id.
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pensated service assurance was not financially feasible." No such
waiver is available under the 1979 regulations.25 In fact, the obliga-
tion will be extended ad infinitum until all deficits in compliance
are eliminated.25 7 New procedural requirements, too numerous to
recount,"* are also added to the obligation and therefore, to the
burden of the grantees. Today the regulations governing the two
Hill-Burton assurances have transformed these promises into a
financial and procedural nightmare for health care providers.259
The extent and nature of the impairment of the Hill-Burton
grantees' contracts with the federal government is not necessary. As
in United States Trust, the important governmental interest
prompting the challenged legislation can be provided for without
modifying the Hill-Burton contracts at all. 260 Alternative means of
achieving the Government's goal could be adopted. A governmental
body is not free to consider impairing its own contracts when other
viable policy alternatives are open to it.281
No mitigating factors justifying the impairment are found in
the nature of the private rights affected. The rights of the Hill-
Burton grantees do not rest on insubstantial equity. The Govern-
ment made the contracts with the Hill-Burton grantees fully aware
of the health care needs of Americans. 2 62 Yet the 1947 regulations did
not demand what the 1979 regulations call for. As in United States
Trust, the Government should not now be allowed to unilaterally
modify its contract to provide for needs that it did not choose to
provide for when the contract was made.26 3 If a retroactive statute
merely restricts a party to gains that he might reasonably have
expected from his contract, the statute is more likely to be reasona-
ble. 2 4 The regulations of HEW were not promulgated to prevent the
255. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1040 (1946); 42 C.F.R. § 53.63 (Supp. 1947).
256. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372-79 (1979) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.503).
257. Id. at 29,375 (to be codified in § 124.503(b)).
258. See Table 1 (Uncompensated Services Regulations) and Table 2 (Community
Service Regulations) in Appendix.
259. Written comments submitted by the American Hospital Association to HEW in
response to HEW's 1978 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking dealt with the impact the proposed
regulations would have on providers. It was pointed out that the addition of the inflation
factor alone would result in a doubling of the uncompensated care obligation by the tenth
year, nearly quintupling the obligation by the twentieth year, and increasing the annual
obligation to 600% of the original amount by the time final loan repayment is made. Com-
ments of the American Hospital Association, December 26, 1978, page 28, found in Public
Comments to the Proposed 1979 Hill-Burton Regulations, Vol. I, Providers.
260. See 431 U.S. at 30.
261. Id. at 30-31. For example, independent legislation could be utilized to deal with
the problem of access to health care for indigents.
262. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 57.
263. See 431 U.S. at 31-32.
264. Id. at 31.
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assisted facilities from enjoying a windfall. Quite to the contrary,
the post-1947 regulations deny the reasonable expectations of as-
sisted facilities in order to permit HEW to expand its own contrac-
tual benefits.
The need to make health care available to all Americans does
not justify the impairment of governmental contracts with Hill-
Burton grantees. When substantial rights are greatly impaired by
retroactive legislation, the need for a strong governmental justifica-
tion becomes more acute. The impairment caused by the post-1947
Hill-Burton regulations, particularly the 1979 regulations, is neither
reasonable nor necessary in light of the nature and extent to which
they impair substantial private rights. The recent Hill-Burton regu-
lations attempt to make health care more available to Americans,
but the Government seeks to do this without additional financial
expenditure on its part. Although the goal is noble, the means are
improper.
V. CONCLUSION
To allow the Government to unilaterally, unnecessarily, and
drastically alter the contractual obligations owed by assisted Hill-
Burton facilities to the Government is to deny Hill-Burton grantees
the constitutional protection of fifth amendment due process. The
post-1947 Hill-Burton regulations, particularly the 1979 regulations,
pertaining to the uncompensated service and community service
assurances, do not merely clarify or serve to accomplish the intent
of the original Hill-Burton Act. These regulations retroactively im-
pair valid contractual obligations. In light of recent Supreme Court
decisions, these regulations are unconstitutional.
MARGARET LYNCH HUDDLESTON
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